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A class of quantum protocols of bit commitment is constructed based on the nonorthogonal 
states coding and the correlation immunity of some Boolean functions. The binding condition of 
these protocols is guaranteed mainly by the law of causality and the concealing condition is 
guaranteed by the indistinguishability between nonorthogonal quantum states and the correlation 
immunity of Boolean functions. We also give out an oblivious transfer protocol based on 
two-nonorthogonal states coding and build a bit commitment protocol on top of it. The 
relationship between these protocols and the well known no-go theorem is also discussed in 
details. 
 
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Hk 
 
Bit commitment is a basic building block of many cryptography protocols [1], especially 
those related with two-party secure computations [2]. Unfortunately, it can be proved that 
there is no classical bit commitment protocol which satisfies unconditionally secure 
conditions in both binding and concealing. It had been believed that with the help of quantum 
mechanics one can construct unconditionally secure bit commitment protocols. Unfortunately 
again, D. Mayers [3] and H. –K. Lo and H. F. Chau [4] proved their well known no-go 
theorem which declares that unconditionally secure bit commitment protocols based on 
quantum mechanics are all ruled out. Since then researchers have presented various 
compromise protocols [5,6]  
Generally speaking, bit commitment protocol is a function { }f : 0,1 X Y× → , where X 
and Y are two finite set. An encryption of { }0,1b∈  is a value of{ }f( , ),b x x X∈ . A bit 
commitment protocol must satisfy two conditions as follows: (1) Concealing. The receiver 
cannot get b from . (2) Binding. The committer can open via sending x to the 
receiver, but he cannot open it both as 0 and as 1. Our basic idea of constructing secure bit 
commitment protocols is to combine nonorthogonal states coding and correlation immune 
Boolean function [1] together to construct unconditionally secure quantum encryption 
functions, and then, based on those functions, we construct unconditionally secure quantum 
bit commitment protocols.  
f( , )b x f( , )b x
Consider a committer Alice and a receiver Bob communicate over a quantum channel as 
well as a classical channel. We limit our attention to two class states coding: two 
nonorthogonal states coding, or Bennett 1992[7] (B92)-like coding, and four states coding, or 
Bennett-Brassard 1984 [8] (BB84)-like coding. The key technique of our protocols is the 
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adoption of correlation immune Boolean function which is defined as follows [1]: Let 
be independent binary variables, each taking on the values 0 or 1 with 
probability 
1 2, , , nA A A…
2
1
. A Boolean function is -order correlation immune if for 
each subset of  random variables 
1 2F( , , , )na a a… 0thn
0n 1 2 0, , , ni i iA A A…  with niii n ≤<<<≤ 0211 " , the 
random variable 1 2F( , , , )nB A A A= …  is statistically independent of the random vector 
(
1 2 0
, , ,
ni i i
A A A… ). 
It can be seen that in the proof of the no-go theorem the authors have not pay attention to 
the case in which though the deference between 0
Bρ and 1Bρ  is infinitesimal but they still 
can be distinguished. We shall give out a detailed explanation of this problem later in 
‘Discussions’. 
 
Quantum Encryption Function. Here we discuss quantum encryption function related with bit 
commitment. For any vector , we can choose { }0,1 ka∈ { }0 1,Ψ Ψ , where 
0 10 < Ψ Ψ <1, to construct a weak one-way function [9] which maps a classical variable 
to a qubit sequence [10]: 
1 21 2
f : ( , , , ) , , ,
kk a a
a a a a= → Ψ Ψ… aΨ… .                            (1) 
When k is sufficiently large, it becomes a strong one-way function [9]. This construction is 
rather simple and direct, but it cannot be used directly to cryptology because the one-way 
function used in cryptology must be an verifiable function. One verifiable function has been 
studied more than twenty years ago as the first quantum bit commitment protocol [8]: 
1 1 2 2
(1) (1) ( 2) ( 2) ( )
1 1 1
1 2
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
f : ( , , , )
, , , , , , , , ,kk k
n n
k
aa a a a
a aa a a
a a a a=
→ Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ
…
… … … … ( ) .k
n
a
a
              (2) 
Where  
{ }( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1,2, , 1 2 1,2, ,( , , , ) 0,1 ni i i ii k n i ka a a a= ==… … ∈…                              (3) 
is picked randomly for each computation, and 
{ } { }(0) (0) (1) (1)0 1 0 1, , , 0 , 1 , ,Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ = + − .                          (4) 
This quantum function is easy to be verified if one has a and { }( ) 1, 2, ,ia i k= … . It can 
be see that this quantum function is an ‘one-way’ function with a key, that is so called 
encryption function. We can find that the number of output qubits for every input bit increases 
quickly. We guess that the number of output qubits corresponding to 1 bit input for a 
verifiable quantum encryption function with verification security O(  is , the 2 )n− O( )n
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number n is so called security parameter. 
It is well known that this encryption function can be opened as different values; this leads to 
the first bit commitment protocol insecure. There is an altered function as follows: 
(1) ( 2) ( )(1) ( 2) ( )
1 1 1
1 1 2 2
1 2
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
f : ( , , , )
, , , , , , , , , .
k k
n n
k k
k
a a aa a
a a a a a a
a a a a=
→ Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ
…
… … … … na         (5) 
It cannot be opened as different input value. Unfortunately, one can get the value of a via 
Breidbart attack before he received{ }( ) 1, ,ia i k= " . 
Now let us consider another essential property of quantum encryption function: 
inalterability. Because of the character of quantum states, especially the existence of attacks 
based on entanglement, we have to inspect carefully the inalterability of a quantum function 
designed for cryptographic purpose. It is obvious that the existence of verifiable and 
unalterable encryption function means directly bit commitment.  
 
We now present this kind of encryption functions as follows: 
1. B92-like scheme. Choose { }0 1 0 1, 0Ψ Ψ < Ψ Ψ <1  and -order correlation 
immune Boolean functions F. For any input 
0
thn
{ }0,1b∈ , picks randomly 
{ }( ) 1,2, , 0,1 ni i ma = ∈…  satisfy ( ) 1,2, ,F( ) .i i ma = b=…  The encryption function is 
       : 2Blob (1) (1) ( ) ( )
1 1
, , , , , ,m
n naa a
b → Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ… … … .ma                    (6) 
2. BB84-like scheme. Choose { }0 , 1 , ,+ − , and -order correlation immune 
Boolean functions F. For any input 
0
thn
{ }0,1b∈ , picks randomly { }( ) 1,2, , 0,1 ni i ma = ∈…  
satisfy ( ) 1,2, ,F( )
i
i ma = =… b  and choose { }{ }( ) 0,1 1,2, ,nia i∈ = … m randomly and 
independently. The encryption function is 
       : 2Blob
(1) ( )(1) ( )
1 1
(1) (1) ( ) ( )
1 1
, , , , , ,
m m
n
m
n n
a aa
aa a
b → Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ … … … nmaa .                   (7) 
Where  
{ } { }(0) (0) (1) (1)0 1 0 1, , , 0 , 1 , ,Ψ Ψ Ψ Ψ = + − .                       (8) 
It can be seen that  and  are weak encryption functions; ‘weak’ means 
the failure probability of guessing the value b does not approaches 0 exponentially. The 
valuable properties of them are verifiability and inalterability. Let us delay the proof of its 
verifiability and inalterability to the security analysis of corresponding bit commitment 
protocols. It is clear that we can construct two strong encryption functions: 
2Blob 4Blob
( )1 2 2 1 2 2 2, , , Blob ( ) Blob ( ) Blob ( )nb b b b b bΑ =… n" ,                        (9) 
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( )1 2 4 1 4 2 4, , , Blob ( ) Blob ( ) Blob ( )nb b b b b bΒ =… n" ,                       (10) 
provided n is sufficiently large. Where ‘strong’ means the probability of successful guess of 
value b approaches 0 exponentially.  
 
Bit Commitment Protocol: B92-Like Case. Committer Alice and receiver Bob choose 
2
0 1 0 1
1, 1
2 4
δ δ⎧ ⎫Ψ Ψ + ≤ Ψ Ψ ≤ − < ≤⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
1;0 δ                         (11) 
Let Acos10 =ΨΨ . It is known that the success probability of distinction between these 
two states is ApA cos1−=  [11,12], then δδ +−≤≤−− 2
1111 Ap . No further 
improvement is possible [12]. The protocol is as follows. 
Commit phase: 
1. Alice and Bob choose an -order correlation immune Boolean functions F, where 0
thn 0n  
satisfies . 0 O(1) ( )n n n− →∼ ∞
2. Alice picks randomly { }( ) 1,2, , 0,1 ni i ma = ∈… , which satisfy ( ) 1,2, ,F( ) .i i ma b= =…  Where 
{ }0,1b∈  is the value Alice committed. 
3. Alice generates (b) (see formula (6)) as an encryption function (or, blob) of her 
commitment and sends it to Bob. 
2Blob
Open phase: 
4. Alice unveil { }{ }( ) 0,1 1,2, ,nia i∈ = … m  to Bob. 
5. Bob verifies that the blob he has received is really coded by{ }( ) 1, 2, ,ia i m= … , and then 
calculates ( )( ) ( ) 1,2, ,F( )i i ib a == … m . If ( ) 1,2, ,i i mb = b=… , he accepts b as the value Alice 
committed. 
Security Analysis: Binding Property. This corresponds to the verifiability and inalterability of 
encryption function (b). We consider first verifiability, that means we can find 2Blob b b′≠  
with a probability approaches 1 exponentially. It can be seen that for any and  which 
satisfy  and  we have 
( )ia′ ( )ja
( )F( )ia = b b′( )F( )ja′ = ( )( ) ( )W 1i jH a a′ ⊕ ≥ . Where  is 
the Hamming weight of a. If Alice unveil 
W ( )H a
( )( ) 1,2, ,, i i mb a =′ ′ " , ( ) 1,2, ,F( )i i ma b= b′ ′= ≠… , then 
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( ( ) ( )W i iH a a′ ⊕ ≥) 1. After performing local operations to (b), Bob can find  
with probability .  (Exponentially) means that for any positive 
real parameter
2Blob b b′ ≠
( )21 sin mBP A≥ − 1→BP
α , we can choose a parameter  which satisfies . This 
means
m α−−> ePB 1
O( )
2 ln(sinA)
m α α> − ∝ . we provide here Alice cannot alter the blob remotely.  
Let us consider next the inalterability of (b). It can be seen that when Alice changes 
the value of  she has to change at least one qubit between 
2Blob
b 0Ψ  and 1Ψ  in each 
n-qubit string. If Alice can realize this kind of change via remote operation, she can construct 
a superluminal signaling scheme with a success probability larger than . Based on 
the law of causality we conclude that the protocol is secure under all kinds of remote (EPR) 
attack related with quantum entanglement. 
Am2cos1−
An attack strategy which does not violate the law of causality is: Alice measures probe 
qubits in her hands, which leads the state of ‘blob-probe’ system collapses to a definite blob 
state and a definite probe state. Based on the law of causality we know that Alice cannot 
control the final state of blob, though she can know it remotely. It is obvious that in this case 
there are 50% n-qubit strings are in the states corresponding to committing 0, and the others 
in the states committing 1.Suppose Alice is so lucky that after the measurement there is only 1 
bit for each wrong n-qubit string has to be changed, the probability of Alice’s failure is 
( ) 22
0
1 1 c1 cos 1
2 2
mmm m kk
m
k
AC A
−
=
⎛ ⎞+⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤ os 1− = − →⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑                      (12) 
To state succinctly, the protocol described is an unconditionally secure binding protocol. 
Security Analysis: Concealing Property. Correlation immune Boolean function has only two 
candidates for case: 0 1n n= − 1 2F( ) na a a a c= ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕" , where { }0,1c∈  is a const. 
Consider of the menace of weight attack, we know this kind of Boolean function will affects 
the security of the protocols, so we study only 0 1n n< −  case. In this case, Bob will not be 
successful except he has get more than  components of a vector 0n { }( ) 1, ,ia a i m∈ = " . It 
can be seen that for each n-qubit string Bob’s failure probability is ( )00( )
0
1
n
n kn k k
A n A A
k
p C p p −
=
= −∑ , 
then Bob’s successful cheat probability is ( )0( )1 mnA AP p= − . The concealing condition 
 (exponentially) means0→AP m)(nA ep 0 β−−> 1 . According to De Moivre-Laplace theorem, 
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for large , we have n
    ∫− −= nn
t
)(n
A dtp 0
2
1
2
2e
2
1 λ
λπ ,                                             (13) 
where
A
0
np
n=λ , 
A
A
p
p
−= 11λ , 12 )1( λλλ −= . Then we can get 
    ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ += )
2
n(erf)
2
n(erf
2
1
21 λλ)(nA 0p ,                                   (14) 
where erf( )z is the error function. Neglecting higher-order terms of the error function , 
we have 
)erf(z
    ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ += −− nn)(nA np
0
2
2
2
1 2
1
2
2
1
1
e1e1
2
1 λλ
λλπ .                                  (15) 
It can be seen that m)(nA ep 0
β−−> 1 will holds if and only if )(βOn >  as β is sufficiently 
large. 
 
Bit Commitment Protocol: BB84-Like Case.  
Commit Phase: 
1. Alice and Bob choose{ }0 , 1 , ,+ − , where ( ) ( )1 10 1 , 0 1
2 2
+ = + − = − , 
and an -order correlation immune Boolean functions F. 0
thn
2. Alice picks { }{ }( ) ( )0,1 F( ) ; 1,2, ,ni ia a b i m∈ = = … { }and  
randomly and independently. Where b is the value Alice committed. 
{ }( ) 0,1 1,2, ,nia i m∈ = …
3. Alice generates (b) and sends it to Bob. 4Blob
Open Phase: 
4. Alice unveils { }{ }( ) 0,1 1,2, ,nia i∈ = … m  to Bob.  
5. Bob verifies that the blob he received is really coded with the bases 
{ }{ }( ) 0,1 1,2, ,nia i∈ = … m  through checking ( ) 1,2, ,F( )i i ma = =… b  with his 
measurement result { }( ) 1, 2, ,ia i m= … . If it is true, he accepts b as the value Alice 
committed.  
Security Analysis: Binding Property. We first consider verifiability of (b). It can 
be seen that with a true set 
4Blob
{ }( ) 1, 2, ,ia i m= …  Bob can get { }( ) 1, 2, ,ia i m= …  with 
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probability 1. He will find ( ) 1,2, ,F( )
i
i ma = =… b . If Alice gives Bob a false set 
{ }( ) 1, 2, ,ia i m′ = …  for changing her committed value from b to , the success 
probability of her cheat will be 
1b⊕
1 0
2
m⎛ ⎞ →⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ (for a sufficiently large m). Now we consider the 
inalterability of (b). What Alice can do are local operations to her probe qubits and 
classical communication for unveil her choices of coding bases. These cannot help her control 
the blob collapsing into a state corresponding to 
4Blob
{ }( ) 1, 2, ,ia i m′ = …  which satisfy 
( )
1,2, ,F( ) 1
i
i ma =′ = ⊕… b with a probability larger than , otherwise she can construct a 
scheme of superluminal communication. Suppose Alice can change Bob’s measurement result 
form 
O(2 )m−
{ }( ) ( )F( ) ; 1, ,i ia a b i m= = …  to{ }( ) ( )F( ) 1; 1, ,i ia a b i m′ ′ = ⊕ = … , they can do as 
follows: 
1. One day Alice generates  by 4Blob ( )b { }( ) 1, 2, ,ia i m= …  and 
{ }( ) ( )F( ) ; 1, ,i ia a b i m= = … , then sends b,  and 4Blob ( )b { }( ) 1, 2, ,ia i m= …  to Bob 
together. They agree on communicating at 8 o’clock next morning. 
2. Next morning at 8 o’clock, Alice and Bob execute their communication. If Alice wants 
to send 0, she does nothing before 8:00, and Bob will find the blob he received is really an 
encryption of b; If Alice wants to send 1, she changes Bob’s blob before 8 o’clock and Bob 
will find the blob he has received is an encryption of 1b b′ = ⊕ .  
Then we believe that Alice cannot control the changes of Bob’s measurement result from 
{ }( ) ( )F( ) ; 1, ,i ia a b i m= = …  to { }( ) ( )F( ) 1; 1, ,i ia a b i m′ ′ = ⊕ = … . A variation of this 
problem is: Suppose F is a balanced Boolean function, then the probability of collapsing into 
a state fitting a given is 0.5. Though Alice cannot control the random collapse to fit her 
object, she can understand the final state of the blob, and unveil a false basis for each wrong 
qubit. This strategy will increase her chance to success for each n-qubit string from 0.5 to 
0.75, but cannot change the conclusion that her success probability of cheat approaches 0 
exponentially. 
b′
Security Analysis: Concealing Property. It can be seen that without{ }( ) 1, 2, ,ia i m= … , 
Bob cannot get { }( ) ( )F( ) ; 1, ,i ia a b i m= = …  correctly. His success probability for each 
n-qubit string is
3 0
4
n⎛ ⎞ →⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . What should be mentioned is: though Bob cannot know any 
component of exactly in BB84-like protocol, he can get 75% components of each ( )ia
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( )ia correctly via randomly chosen measurement bases. He can even get ~85% components of 
each  via Breidbart attack. Consider of the sufficient large of parameter m, we should 
adopt correlation immune Boolean function in BB84-like protocol either. 
( )ia
Now let us see an alternative way to unconditionally secure bit commitment. Making use 
of the idea in B92-like protocol, we can construct a more practical bit commitment protocol 
via constructing first an unconditionally secure oblivious transfer protocol as follows: 
1. Alice generates a qubit sequence according to her classical 
message : 1 2( , , , )na a a a= " 1 2, , , na a aΨ Ψ Ψ…  and sends it to Bob. Where 
{ }0 1,Ψ Ψ the same as is described in (11).  
2.  Bob measures each qubits by a way which allows him to get a exact subset of 
{ }1,2, ,ia i n= " . 
It is obvious that Bob can only get a proper subset of { }1,2, ,ia i n= "  since his 
ability of differentiating between two nonorthogonal states is limited by 0 11Ap = − Ψ Ψ . 
The probability of getting all components of a is . Now let us see why Alice 
cannot know which subset is the one Bob get. Suppose Alice can get some information of 
Bob’s subset, Alice and Bob can execute following protocol: 
( ) 0nAp →
1. Alice sends { }1, 2, , 2ia i nΨ = "  to Bob. 
2. Bob chooses one of two choices as follows: one is measuring the first n qubits with 
basis { }0 0,Ψ Ψ  and the second n qubits with{ }1 1,Ψ Ψ , where 0Ψ  and 1Ψ  is 
orthogonal states of 0Ψ  and 1Ψ  respectively; the other one is reverse.  
It can be seen that Alice will know Bob’s choice remotely if she can get any information 
about Bob’s subset, then Alice and Bob realize a superluminal communication. We conclude 
that based on the principle of superposition of states and the law of causality we have proved 
the oblivious transfer protocol described above is unconditionally secure. Now let us 
construct a bit commitment protocol via this unconditionally secure oblivious transfer channel. 
Let F be an -order correlation immune Boolean functions shared by the committer Alice 
and the receiver Bob.  
0
thn
Commit phase: 
1. Alice picks randomly { }( ) ( )F( ) ; 1, ,i ia a b i m= = …  and sends it to Bob via the 
secure oblivious transfer channel. 
2. Bob gets proper subsets { }( ) 1, 2, ,is i m= " . 
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Open phase: 
3. Alice unveils { }( ) 1, 2, ,ia i m= " to Bob via a classical channel. 
4. Bob verifies that whether is really a subset of for each number . If it is true, 
do the next step. 
( )is ( )ia i
5. Bob calculates ( ) 1,2, ,F( )
i
i ma = … . If 
( )
1,2, ,F( )
i
i ma = b=… , he accepts b as the value Alice 
committed. 
It can be seen that one have to trace back to original B92-like bit commitment protocol if 
he wants to analyze thoroughly the security problem of this protocol, especially various 
possible cheat strategy. The advantages of this protocol are simple in concept and robust in 
practice, especially that it does not rely on Bob’s ability of quantum storage. 
   
Discussions. An unevadable question is: why Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem does not work 
upon these protocols? Before answer this question, I would like to clarify first the relationship 
of two concepts: one concept is (such as) the trace distance between quantum states ρ  and 
σ  is infinitesimal; the other concept is the two states cannot be distinguished efficiently. It 
can be seen that these two concepts are not equivalent in some cases, such as in the case we 
described in B92-like scheme and BB84-like scheme. In those cases, because the security 
parameter m and n are both sufficiently large, any two blobs which have one qubit difference 
in each n-qubit string can be distinguished with probability , though the trace distance 
between these two blobs is  
1→
( )
( )
( )
(1) ( 2) ( ) (1) ( 2) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
W ( ) 1
1 1
1 1
0 0 1 1
D ,
1 1 tr
2
1 1 tr
2
1 tr
2
1 (0,0,1) (sin 2 ,0cos 2 )
2
1 1sin O
m m i i
H
j j j j
i i i i
j j j j
i i i i
B B
a a a a a a a a
m n
a a a a
j i
m n
a a a a
j i
mn
mn
n
A A
n
A
n n
ρ ρ′ ′ ′ ′ ⊕ =
′ ′
= =
′ ′
= =
= Ψ Ψ − Ψ Ψ
⎛ ⎞≤ Ψ Ψ − Ψ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= Ψ Ψ − Ψ Ψ
= −
⎛=
∑∑
∑∑
" "
∼ .⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
Ψ
1
B
                       (16) 
Now let us answer the unevadable question. It is clear that the protocols presented here 
belong 0
Bρ ρ≠ case. The proof of no-go theorem was completed in this case by citing 
Uhlmann’s theorem related with purification of mixed states. It can be seen that their proof 
can only leads to the conclusion that if the trace distance (for example) between states 0
Bρ  
and 1
Bρ is infinitesimal, the trace distance between the two states that Bob finally gets must be as 
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well infinitesimal with the same or higher order. It is obvious that the example we just calculated 
is consist with this conclusion, though it is obvious as well that the two different concepts should 
not be confused. 
In order to construct encryption function with verifiability as well as inalterability, we have to 
map one bit to  qubits. This leads to the distinction of any given pair of blobs having 
success probability approaches 1, then we get unconditionally secure binding property. It can be 
seen that any protocol of this character will not be a good concealing one except both 
( )2O n
0
Bρ  and 
1
Bρ  are multi-ford. We introduce correlation immune Boolean function to code committed bit, 
leads to mapping 1 bit into about states, which makes Bob lost his object to compare with, 
even though he has the ability. This situation has not been considered in the proof of no-go 
theorem. 
2O( )2 n
We can see that in our protocols Alice’s cheats may sometimes lead to a first order 
infinitesimal, though the concealing is unconditionally secure. The reason is we have combined 
the non-orthogonal states coding with correlation immune Boolean transformation together. 
Concretely speaking, this result does not conflict with the formal proof of no-go theorem since the 
concealing we realized by quantum system is only
1O
n
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ,  that is , we only require the 
non-orthogonal property of states guarantees that there is at least n-n0 qubits that Bob cannot get 
for each n-qubit string. The improvement of concealing from 
1O
n
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  to  is obtained 
by means of correlation immunity of Boolean function, which guarantees that F(a) is statistically 
independent to any  components of a. 
(O 2 n− )
0n
Briefly speaking, the proof of no-go theorem ignored the case in which the difference of two 
density matrixes being infinitesimal does not always means one cannot distinguish them. This case 
may caused by the multi-ford property of 0
Bρ  and 1Bρ  while we introduce a classical ensemble 
which mingled with the original quantum ensemble inseparably.  
We conjecture that  qubits encryption function is essential for any non-interactive, 
unconditionally secure bit commitment protocols, and for any unconditionally secure, verifiable 
and unalterable strong quantum encryption function with n bits input must have an output 
with  qubits. 
2O( )n
3O( )n
It can be seen that Boolean function F can be substitute with function ( ) : 
, where  as n . This kind of substitution does not affect our 
,n k
{ } { }0,1 0,1n k→ ( )O 1k ∼ →∞
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conjecture.  
It is easy to construct an unconditionally secure coin-flipping protocol on the top of these 
bit commitment protocols.  
It should be mentioned that the loss of channel has no fatal affection to protocols 
presented here.  
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